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The logic of sheaves, sheaf forcing and the independence
of the Continuum Hypothesis
J. Benavides∗
Abstract
An introduction is given to the logic of sheaves of structures and to set theoretic
forcing constructions based on this logic. Using these tools, it is presented an alternative
proof of the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis; which simplifies and unifies
the classical boolean and intuitionistic approaches, avoiding the difficulties linked to
the categorical machinery of the topoi based approach.
Introduction
The first of the 10 problems that Hilbert posed in his famous conference the 1900 in Paris 1,
the problem of the Continuum Hypothesis (CH for short), which asserts that every subset
of the real numbers is either enumerable or has the cardinality of the Continuum; was the
origin of probably one of the greatest achievements in Mathematics of the second half of the
XX century: The forcing technique created by Paul Cohen during the sixties. Using this
technique Cohen showed that the CH is independent (i.e. it cannot be proved or disproved)
from the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel plus the Axiom of Choice (ZFC).
At the beginning Cohen approached the problem in a pure syntactic way, he defined
a procedure to find a contradiction in ZFC given a contradiction in ZFC + ¬CH ; which
implies that Con(ZFC) → Con(ZFC + ¬CH) (The consistency of ZFC implies the con-
sistency of ZFC + ¬CH). However this approach was a non-constructivist one, for it was
not given a model of ZFC+¬CH . Nevertheless in his publish papers Cohen developed two
other approaches more constructivist. The first one assumes the existence of a countable
transitive model (c.t.m.) of ZFC 2, then considering any finite list of axioms ϕ1, ..., ϕn of
ZFC + ¬CH he proved within ZFC the existence of a c.t.m for ϕ1, ..., ϕn. The second one
formalizes logic within ZFC, being a formal theorem of ZFC the result which expresses
that for any c.t.m. of ZFC exists a c.t.m. of ZFC + ¬CH which is an extension of the
ground model. A couple of years later, in 1965, Scott and Solovay gave an even more con-
structive version of Cohen’s technique based on Boolean Valued models, i.e. models rule by
a Boolean-valued logic; the advantage of this approach is the fact that it made more evident
∗Department of mathematics "Ulisse Dini", University of Florence, navarro@math.unifi.it
1The Hilberts Problems are 23 but in the conference he presented just 10 problems, problems 1, 2, 6, 7,
8, 13, 16, 19, 21 and 22 in the publish paper [H1].
2Remember that by the Gödel theorem the existence of such model cannot be proved within ZFC.
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how a model for ZFC+¬CH is constructed. An analogous approach on Kripke Models was
developed by Fitting on 1969, he reinterpreted the forcing technique as the construction of
a Kripke Model over certain partial orders in such a way that each of the fibers are models
of Set Theory. Independently around 1963, Lawvere and Tierney attempts to axiomatise
the category of sets conduced them to the work of Grothendieck on the generalization of the
notion of sheaf in the context of Category Theory. Lawvere discovered that sheaves sited on
a Grothendieck topology (a Grothendieck topos) admit the basic operations of set theory.
In the same period Tierney realized that Grothendieck’s work could be used to approach
an axiomatic study of sheaves. After this (around 1964), working together, Lawvere and
Tierney axiomatise the Categories of Sheaves of Sets, and then the category of sets, using
a categorial formulation of set-theoretic properties. Later, in 1972, Tierney found that in
this context the notion of sheaf allowed to explain Cohen’s Forcing and the Solovay-Scott
approach in terms of topoi, obtaining a topos which contain a sheaf which lies between
the sheaf of the natural numbers and its power sheaf, which despite of being an intuitionist
model can be collapsed to a classical one. Also during this period, in 1971, Schoenfield noted
that the construction of Scott and Solovay could be adapted to partial orders independently
of the Boolean scheme, here is when the form of forcing as we understand it nowadays ap-
peared.
It is at this point in history that forcing created a link between Set theory, Topos theory,
and, by the idea of completing theories by forcing developed by Barwise and Robinson, also
with Model Theory. This can be also understood as a bridge between classical Logic of
classical set theory, the intuitionist logic intrinsic to topoi and Kripke’s Models, and infini-
tary logics which had been studied in Model theory. However the startling aspect implicit
in these connections did not play a fundamental role on further developments, each theory
followed mainly their own motivations, and the different formulations of Cohen’s forcing
and their intrinsic difficulties did not suffer great variations or improvements, even when
numerous and fundamental results were obtained using this technique.
In 1995, X. Caicedo in its outstanding paper, The Logic of Sheaves of Structures [C],
introduced a new approximation to Kripke-Joyal semantics, avoiding the technicalities of
Topos and Category theory. In this context he introduced a notion of a generic filter on the
variation domain of a sheaf of structures and via these filters he proved the corresponding
Generic Model Theorem (a generalization of the generic model theorem of Forcing and the
Łoś theorem on ultraproducts), which allows the collapse of an structure of variable ob-
jects to an static limit, unifying set theoretic forcing constructions and the model existence
theorems of classical and infinitary logics like completeness, compactness, omitting types
etc. The simplicity and elegance of the proofs of these classical results of model theory in
this context is remarkably, here the bridge that forcing establishes between Topos Theory,
Set theory and Model Theory reappear showing its fundamental character. In this paper I
will show how, using these tools, it is possible to give an alternative proof of the Indepen-
dence of the Continuum Hypothesis which simplifies and unifies the classical boolean and
intuitionistic approaches and at the same time avoids most of the categorical tools of the
topoi based approach. It will follow that the approaches of Scott-Solovay and Fitting are
just particular cases of the construction of a Cumulative Hierarchy of variable sets over an
arbitrary topological space; and instead of considering sheaves within a particular topos we
will just need a sheaf which will correspond to the construction of a Cumulative Hierarchy
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of variable sets within a topos.
1 Sheaves of Structures
In this section I will give a brief summary of some of the results contained in the paper of
X. Caicedo [C]; the main objective will be to introduce the sheaves of structures, to under-
stand the logic that will govern them and to introduce generic models and the fundamental
theorem of Model Theory. Most of the results will be given without a proof, a detailed
and elegant introduction about these results is contained in [C], nevertheless I will try to
motivate the definitions and the results.
1.1 The Logic of Sheaves of Structures
The sheaves of structures will be formed by variable objects, which variate over a structure (a
frame) of "States of Knowledge" . To motivate the definition we can make the next analogy,
consider the frame of variation as spatio-temporal states, and us as variable objects which
variate over these states. Our "truths" and "properties" will be conditioned by extensions
within these spatio temporal states. This latter aspect is fundamental, opposite to classical
logic where the truth is absolute and independent of the context, the logic of the variable
objects will be determined by a very natural principle:
"A proposition about an object will be true if it is true in an extension where this object
lies."
We can translate this ideas in mathematical terms very easily, we can think, for example,
the extensions as neighbourhoods in a topological space and the objects as functions such
that its image determine its characteristics in some instant or context. It is here where the
notion of sheaf in its more elementary definition, a sheaf over a topological space, become
very useful.
Definition 1.1. Let X be a topological space, a sheaf over X is a couple (E, p) where E is
a topological space and P : E → X is a local homeomorphism, i.e., a function such that for
each e ∈ E there exists a neighbourhood V of e such that:
1. p(V ) is open in X
2. p ↾V : V → P (V ) is an homeomorphism.
Given an open set U in X, a function σ : U → E such that p ◦ σ = idU is called a local
section, if U = X, σ is called a global section. The set p−1(x) ⊂ E for x ∈ X is called the
fibre of X.
Now using the notion of sheaf we can translate our intuitive ideas in mathematical terms
in a very interesting way: Consider the spatio temporal states as a sheaf (E, p) over a space
X , where X describes for example the causal relations i.e. a structure which describe how
events relate with others events, the variable objects will be sections σ on this sheaf in such a
way that at each instant x ∈ X (each node on the causal structure X) σ(x) determine what
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σ perceives at the instant x, thus σ(x) can be understood as the causal past of x and the
fiber p−1(x) can be understand as the sets of possible causal pasts of x 3. Furthermore, we
know that if two sections coincide in one point, they coincide in a neighbourhood containing
the point (this is a classical result that can be proved without too much difficulty), thus
the equality relation satisfies our truth paradigm, two objects are seeing to be equal if and
only if they coincide in an extension. With this example in mind we can construct a natural
Model Theory of variable objects, the sheaves of structures.
Definition 1.2. Given a fix type of structures τ = (Rn, ..., fm, ..., c, ...) a sheaf of τ-
structures A over a topological space X is given by:
a-) A sheaf (E, p) over X.
b-) For each x ∈ X, an L-structure Ax = (Ex, Rx, ..., fx, ..., cx, ...). where Ex = p−1(x) (the
fiber, which could be empty) is the universe of the L-structure A, and should satisfy:
i. RA =
⋃
xRx is open in
⋃
xE
n
x seeing as subspace of E
n, where R is an n-ary relation
symbol.
ii. fA =
⋃
x fx :
⋃
xE
m
x →
⋃
xEx is a continuous function where f is an m-parameter
function symbol.
iii. h : X → E such that h(x) = cx, where c is a constant symbol, is continuous.
Given our logical language we need now an interpretation, a semantics of our structures.
We can follow the reasoning within our previous example, as we said our objects will be the
sections of the sheaves of structures that can represent, for example, observers in spacetime
(timelike geodesics) which properties ( or what is “true" for them) variate over the nodes (a
local spacelike slice for example) of the causal structure. Therefore the logical propositions
about this objects will be of the form: The observers σ1, σ2, ..., σn have (or perceive to have
) the property P in the node x. And the observers will perceive something as "true" at the
node x if holds in an extension ( a close past, the present and the future) containing the
node x. Or more precisely:
Definition 1.3. Let Lτ be a first order language of type τ . Given a sheaf of structures A
of type τ over X, for ϕ(v1, ..., vn) ∈ Lτ we can define by induction A x ϕ(σ1, ..., σn) (A
forces ϕ(σ1, ..., σn) in x ∈ X for the sections σ1, ..., σn of A defined in x):
1. If ϕ is an atomic formula and t1, ..., tk are τ-terms:
A x (t1 = t2)[σ1, ..., σn]⇔ t
Ax
1 [σ1(x), ..., σn(x)] = t
Ax
2 [σ1(x), ..., σn(x)]
A x R(t1, ..., tn)[σ1, ..., σn]⇔ (t
Ax
1 [σ1(x), ..., σn(x)], ..., t
Ax
n [σ1(x), ..., σn(x)]) ∈ Rx
2. A x (ϕ ∧ ψ)[σ1, ..., σn]⇔ A x ϕ[σ1, ..., σn] and A x ψ[σ1, ..., σn]
3. A x (ϕ ∨ ψ)[σ1, ..., σn]⇔ A x ϕ[σ1, ..., σn] or A x ψ[σ1, ..., σn].
3I should say here that this is more than an analogy, the recent work of C. Isham [I2], F. Markopoulou
[M] and J. L. Bell [Be] deal with similar ideas in the context of topos theory and Frame-Valued sets. I think
that the approach that I am presenting here will be useful also in this context. I have used this tools on
Quantum Mechanics showing how these tools can give us a new interesting perspective of the theory (see
[B3]) that can be fundamental to a future development of a Quantum Gravity theory.
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4. A x ¬ϕ[σ1, ..., σn] ⇔ exists U neighbourhood of x such that for all y ∈ U , A 1y
ϕ[σ1, ..., σn].
5. A x (ϕ → ψ)[σ1, ..., σn] ⇔ Exists U neighbourhood of x such that for all y ∈ U if
A y ϕ[σ1, ..., σn] then A y ψ[σ1, ..., σn].
6. A x ∃vϕ(v, σ1, ..., σn)⇔ exists σ defined in x such that A x ϕ(σ, σ1, ..., σn)
7. A x ∀vϕ(v, σ1, ..., σn)⇔ exists U neighbourhood of x such that for all y ∈ U and all
σ define in y, A y ϕ[σ, σ1, ..., σn].
(In 4,5,7 U should satisfy U ⊆
⋂
i dom(σi))
The first consequence of the definition is that our principle of "truth" is maintained, i.e
if some proposition is true at a node x it is also true in an extension containing x.
Corollary 1.1. A x ϕ[σ1, ..., σn] if and only if there exists a neighbourhood of x, U , such
that A y ϕ[σ1, ..., σn] for all y ∈ U
Thus, it is clear that the extensional property of truth is a fundamental characteristic
of these structures, furthermore we can characterize the semantics in terms of extensions
instead of nodes obtaining a simple version of the Kripke-Joyal semantics.
Definition 1.4. Given an open set U ⊂ X and σi sections define in U , we say that
A U ϕ[σ1, ..., σn]⇔ for all x ∈ U A x ϕ[σ1, ..., σn]
Theorem 1.1 (Kripke-Joyal semantics). A U ϕ[σ1, ..., σn] is defined by:
1. If ϕ is an atomic formula:
A U σ1 = σ2 ⇔ σ1 ↾U= σ2 ↾U .
A U R[σ1, ..., σn]⇔ (σ1, ..., σn)(U) ⊆ RA.
2. A U (ϕ ∧ ψ)[σ1, ..., σn]⇔ A U ϕ[σ1, ..., σn] and A U ψ[σ1, ..., σn].
3. A U (ϕ ∨ ψ)[σ1, ..., σn] ⇔ there exist open sets V,W such that U = V ∪ W , A V
ϕ[σ1, ..., σn] and A W ψ[σ1, ..., σn].
4. A U ¬ϕ[σ1, ..., σn]⇔ For all open set W ⊆ U , W 6= ∅, A 1W ϕ[σ1, ..., σn].
5. A U ϕ → ψ[σ1, ..., σn] ⇔ for all open set W ⊂ U , if A W ϕ[σ1, ..., σn] then
A W ψ[σ1, ..., σn].
6. A U ∃vϕ(v, σ1, ..., σn)⇔ there exists {Ui}i an open cover of U and µi sections defined
on Ui such that A Ui ϕ[µi, σ1, ..., σn] for all i.
7. A U ∀ϕ(v, σ1, ..., σn) ⇔ for all open set W ⊂ U and µ defined on W , A W
ϕ(µ, σ1, ..., σn).
The geometrical character of this theorem and the previous definitions show an explicit
connection between geometry and logic. For example the result about the existential quan-
tifier in the theorem above shows that the validity of a proposition involving an existential
in a open set U , does not imply the existence of a global open section in this set, but just
the existence of a family of sections which satisfy the property locally; this not implies the
existence of a global section, but implies the existence of a section which satisfy the property
defined in a dense open set contained in U (see theorem 3.3 in [C]). In the same way the
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logic also can determine the topological features of the fiber space and viceversa; it can be
proved, for example, that the excluded middle is forced in a node x if and only if there
exists a neighbourhood U of x such that in p−1(U) the Hausdorff property (T2) holds. Thus
the topology of the ground space and of the fiber space conditioned the logic; a particular
trivial case is when the node x is an isolate point in X or when X = {x}, in theses cases
we obtain we obtain classical logic as an special case of the logic of sheaves of structures, or
more precisely in these situations for every formula ϕ:
A  ϕ↔ Ax |= ϕ.
The next natural question is what is the logic that rules the sheaves of structures, is
any logic we know? The answer is very interesting, we will see that the logic of sheaves
of structures is an intermediate logic between intuitionistic logic and classical logic. This
means that, a proposition is a law of the intuinionistic logic if and only if is forced en each
node of every sheaf of structures, but as we see, depending on the topology of the ground
space, we know that this logic can get closer to classical logic.
To see that intuitionistic logic holds on the sheaves of structures lets remember how Kripke’s
Models and the respective forcing are defined:
Definition 1.5. K = 〈P,≤, (Kp)p∈P, (fpq)(p,q)∈P〉 is a τ-Kripke model if:
i. (P,≤) is a partial order.
ii. For each p ∈ P, Kp is a classic τ-structure.
iii. Given p, q ∈ P if p ≤ q there exists an homomorphism
fpq : Kp → Kq
such that fpp = idKp and if t ≥ q ≥ p, fqt ◦ fpq = fpt
Definition 1.6 (Kripke’s Forcing). Given a Kripke model K = 〈P,≤, (Ki)i∈P, (fpq)(p,q)∈P〉
we define for p ∈ P, p ϕ (ϕ is forced at the node p) as:
1. p a1 = a2 ⇔ a1 = a2
2. p R(a1, ..., an)⇔ (a1, ..., an) ∈ RKp
3. p (ϕ→ ψ)[a1, ..., an]⇔ ∀q ≥ p,q ϕ[fpq(a1), ..., fpq(an)]⇒q ψ[fpq(a1), ..., fpq(an)].
4. p ¬ϕ[a1, ..., an]⇔ ∀q ≥ p :1q ϕ[fpq(a1), ..., fpq(an)].
5. p ∃xϕ(x)[a1 , ..., an]⇔ exists a ∈ Kp such that p ϕ[a, a1, ..., an].
6. p ∀xϕ(x)[a1 , ..., an]⇔ ∀q ≥ p ∀b ∈ Kq :q ϕ[b, fpq(a1), ..., fpq(an)].
A Kripke model can be seen as a Sheaf of Structures in the next way: In P consider the
topology which has as a base the sets of the form [r) = {t ∈ P : t ≥ r} for r ∈ P. We write
the topology generated by these sets as P+, the open sets of this topology are the hereditary
subsets of the order i.e. P+ = {S ⊂ P : for all i ∈ S if j ≥ i then j ∈ S}. For each q ∈ P
take as its fiber the set Kq = p
−1(q). On the set E =
⋃˙
q∈PKq we consider the topology
generated by the images of the sections σ := (ai)i∈U where ai ∈ Ki , U is an open set and
fij(ai) = aj for i ≤ j. In this way we get a sheaf of structures K∗ of type τ over the space
X = (P,P+). It can be proved that all the inuitionistic laws and all the theorems of the
Heyting calculus hold on every node of all sheafs, and if a proposition holds in all the sheafs
particularly holds in a Kripke Model, thus by the completeness theorem (see [Van] theorem
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5.3.10) it can be deduced by the Heyting calculus.
An alternative way to see that intuitionistic logic hold in all the sheafs of structures is
to consider a topological valuation on formulas. Let σ1, ..., σn sections of a sheaf A defined
on an open set U , we define the "truth value" of a proposition ϕ in U as:
[[ϕ[σ1 , ..., σn]]]U := {x ∈ U : A x ϕ[σ1, ..., σn]}
From corollary 1.1 we know that [[ϕ[σ1, ..., σn]]]U is an open set, thus we can define a
valuation as a topological valuation on formulas:
TU : ϕ 7→ [[ϕ[σ1, ..., σn]]]U
Note from the definition of the logic we can define the value of the logic operator in terms of
the operations of the algebra of open sets. For instance the proposition ¬ϕ is valid in a point
if there exists a neighbourhood of that point where ϕ does not hold at each point, then ¬ϕ
holds in the interior of the complement of the set where ϕ holds i.e [[¬ϕ]]U = Int((U \[[ϕ]]U ).
Reasoning in analogous way we have:
1. [[σ1 = σ2]]U = {x ∈ U : σ1(x) = σ2(x)}.
2. [[R[σ1, ..., σn]]]U = {x ∈ U : (σ1(x), ..., σn(x)) ∈ RA}
3. [[¬ϕ]]U = Int((U \ [[ϕ]]U ),
4. [[ϕ ∧ ψ]]U = [[ϕ]]U ∩ [[ψ]]U ,
5. [[ϕ ∨ ψ]]U = [[ϕ]]U ∪ [[ψ]]U ,
6. [[ϕ→ ψ]]U = Int((U \ [[ϕ]]U ) ∪ [[ψ]]U ),
7. [[∃uϕ(u)]]U =
⋃σ∈W W ⊂ U [[ϕ[σ]]]W ,
8. [[∀uϕ(u)]]U = Int(
⋂σ∈W
W⊂U [[ϕ[σ]]]W ).
It follows then
A U ϕ[σ1, ..., σn]↔ [[ϕ[σ1, ..., σn]]]U = U.
Therefore, since the open sets form a complete Heyting algebra, and we have defined the
logic operators in terms of the algebra operations, we have that the formulas that get the
value 1 in complete Heyting algebras are forced in every sheaf of structures. From these
results which relate the sheaves of structures with Kripke’s models and intuitionistic logic
is becoming clear that the independence results based on Kripke’s Model are just particular
cases of this more general approach. On the other hand the approach based on Boolean
Valued Models of set theory, developed originally by Scott, can be reduced to a sheaf of
structures where the “truth" values [[ϕ(σ1 , ..., σn]]U are clopen sets. However to see how
the approach treated here include completely the intuitionistic and Boolean Valued Model
approaches we need one more result.
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1.2 Generic Models
As was sketched in the introduction, the notion of generic model and the respective generic
model theorem, in the context of sheaves of structures, are the fundamental results that will
unify the notion of generic model in set theoretic forcing and the generic models of Model
Theory introduced by Robinson. In a few words, these two approaches can be seen as the
construction of classical structures from Kripke’s Models using a generic filter to connect the
semantics of the classical structures with the semantics of the Kripke’s model. From this,
as we seen before that Kripke’s models are just an special case of our sheaves of structures,
the notion of generic model can be easy generalized in this context. The main advantage
will be that the usual conditions of enumerability, that are assumed to show the existence of
generic models in the classical approaches, will not be necessary in this more general context.
Definition 1.7. Let X be a topological space and Op(X) the set of open sets of X . Let
F ⊂ Op(X), F is called a filter of open sets of X if:
i. X ∈ F .
ii. If U, V ∈ F then U ∩ V ∈ F .
iii.Given V ∈ F If V ⊂ U then U ∈ F .
Definition 1.8. Let A be a sheaf of structures of type τ over X. Let F be a filter of open
sets of X, we say that F is a Generic Filter of A if:
i. Given ϕ(v1, ..., vn) and σ1, ..., σn arbitrary sections of A define on U ∈ F , there exists
W ∈ F such that A W ϕ[σ1, ..., σn] or A W ¬ϕ[σ1, ..., σn].
ii. Given σ1, ..., σn arbitrary sections of A define on U ∈ F , and ϕ(v, v1, ..., vn) a first order
formula. If A U ∃vϕ(v, σ1, ..., σn) then it exists W ∈ F and σ defined on W such that
A W ϕ(σ, σ1, ..., σn).
Consider now A(U) = {σ : dom(σ) = U} the sections with domain U . A(U) is a
structure of the same type of A seen as a substructure of
∏
x∈U Ax. If V ⊂ U there is a
natural homomorphism ρUV : A(U) → A(V ), such that ρUV (σ) = σ ↾ V . Now we can a
construct a new classical τ -structure as the direct limit of the A(U) as U variates over a
filter F :
Definition 1.9. Let A be a sheaf of structures and F a filter over X, we can associate a
classical model to A in the next way:
let
A[F ] = lim
→U∈F
A(U)
i.e
A[F ] =
⋃˙
U∈F
A(U)/∼F
where for σ ∈ A(U) and µ ∈ A(V )
σ ∼F µ⇔ existe W ∈ F tal que σ ↾W= µ ↾W
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Let [σ] the class of σ. We define the relations and functions in the next way:
([σ1], ..., [σn]) ∈ R
A[F ] ⇔ existe U ∈ F : (σ1, ..., σn) ∈ R
A(U)
fA[F ]([σ1], ..., [σn]) = [f
A(U)(σ1, ..., σn)]
F . If F is a generic filter over X for A we say that A[F ] is a generic model.
We have then the next fundamental result:
Theorem 1.2 (The Fundamental Theorem of Model Theory). Let F be a generic filter over
X for A, we have then:
A[F ] |= ϕ([σ1], ..., [σn]) ⇔ existe U ∈ F tal que A U ϕ
G(σ1, ..., σn)
⇔ {x ∈ X : A x ϕ
G(σ1, ..., σn)} ∈ F
Where ϕG is the Gödel translation4 of the formula ϕ. ϕ.
The name of the theorem is due to the fact that the fundamental theorems of Model
Theory can be reinterpreted as the construction of generic models over appropriate sheafs
(see [C] section 6). Now the approaches of Fitting and Scott can be interpreted as the
construction of generic models over some Kripke’s Models and Boolean Valued Models re-
spectively, that are just especial cases of the construction of the cumulative hierarchy of
variable sets over a topological space.
2 The Cumulative Hierarchy of Variable Sets
We will construct now the Cumulative Hierarchy of variable sets, we limit ourselves to the
construction of the case based over a partial order with the topology of the hereditary subsets;
mainly because to prove the independence of the CH this will be enough. Nevertheless this
construction can be done over arbitrary topological spaces see [C] or [B1] section 1.7. We
will obtain a sheaf of structures over a partial order P, such that any fiber V (p) will be an
intuitionistic model of ZFC5 that can be collapsed to classical models via the fundamental
theorem of Model Theory. The results presented in this section were originally developed in
[Vi]. The part concerning the axiom of choice was developed in [Ri] and I introduce some
results about functions that will be useful in the next section.
2.1 Definition and Elementary Properties
To introduce the definition of the cumulative hierarchy we can use the interpretation that
categorist use to introduce the objects of SET P, the advantage here is that the motivation
translate literally in the definition; we obtain a truly structure of variable sets constructed
over our classical ∈ defining a truly belonging relation between variable sets and not arrows
between objects. Hilbert can rest in peace, even if we will leave Cantor’s Paradise we will
4See [Van] chapter 5 or [B1] section 0.2.
5We will see that some Axioms of ZFC are not forced in its standard form but in alternatively intuition-
istic versions that result to be classical equivalent to the standard ones.
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arrive to Cantor’s Heaven avoiding the creepy commutative-diagram purgatory.
Using the comprehension axiom of set theory, given a proposition ϕ(x), for any set A we
can construct a set B such that x ∈ B if and only if x ∈ A and ϕ(x) is "truth" for x. As we
have seen the notion of truth in our sheaves of structures is not absolute but is based in the
extensional truth paradigm. To see how this notion of truth translate when we talk about
sets lets consider the next example: Let ϕ(x) be the next proposition “ x is an even number
greater or equal than 4, and, x can be written as the sum of two prime numbers" . In this
moment at my ubication on spacetime p :=“between the 21:00 and the 22:00, of the 5 March
2011, in some place at London" I cannot assure that {z ∈ N : ϕ(x)} = {x ∈ N : x ≥ 4 ∧ (x
is even )}, i.e. that the Goldbach Conjecture is true. However ϕ can be used to get a set at
the node p,
ϕ(p) = {x : ϕ(x) holds at the node p.}
The Goldbach conjecture has been verified for a huge number of even numbers, and this
set of numbers will keep growing each time we will find a new prime number. Probably
(maybe not) some day the Goldbach Conjecture will be proved or disproved, but the im-
portant feature that follow from this example is that instead of conceiving sets as absolute
entities, we can conceive them as variable structures which variate over our Library of the
states of Knowledge. It is natural then to conceive the set of nodes over our states of Knowl-
edge variates, as nodes in a partial order or points in a topological space that can represent,
for example, the causal structure of spacetime. Our "states Knowledge" will be then struc-
tures that represent the sets as we see them in our nodes. Therefore, from each node we
will see arise a cumulative Hierarchy of variable sets, which structure will be conditioned by
the perception of the variable structures at the other nodes which relate with it. Or more
precisely:
Definition 2.1. Let (P;≤) be a partial order, for p ∈ P we define recursively :
V0(p) = ∅
Vλ(p) =
⋃
α≤λ Vα(p) if λ is a limit ordinal.
Vα+1(p) = {f : [p)→
⋃
q≥p P(Vα(q)) : if p ≤ q → f(q) ⊂ Vα(q), and, if
p ≤ q ≤ r → ∀g ∈ f(q)(g ↾[r)∈ f(r))}
We define then “the universe at the event p", as V (p) =
⋃
α∈On Vα(p) and we denote
by V P the sheaf of structures of the variable sets over P with the topology of the hereditary
subsets.
For each p ∈ P and α ∈ On, Vα(p) is a set of functions defined on [p) which values for
q ∈ [p) are sets of functions defined on [q) which values for r ∈ [q) are sets of functions on
[r) and so on. The next step will be to define the belonging relation. Thus in the more
natural way we define:
p a ∈ f (in the node p, a belongs to f is forced)⇔ a ∈ f(p),
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where the ∈ in the right side is just the classical belonging relation between sets. Now
we have defined the belonging relation, our first result will be to show that if the partial
order is not trivial, i.e if it has at lest two related elements, then the cumulative hierarchy
V (p), where p is a point which is related with a different element, is not isomorphic to the
classical Cumulative hierarchy V .
Lemma 2.1. Let (P,≤) a partial order with at least two different elements related. Let
p, q ∈ P such that p 6= q and p ≤ q, then V (p) with the belonging relation defined above is
not isomorphic to the Classical Cumulative hierarchy of set theory V .
Proof. V0(p) = ∅ = V0(q) and V1(p) = {f : [p)→
⋃
q≥p{∅}} = {f : [p)→ {∅} : f(s) = ∅ for
all s}. As in the classical cumulative hierarchy6 V1(p) has just one element; but in the next
step we get
V2(p) = {V0 ↾[p), V1 ↾[p), {(p, ∅), (q, {f}), ...}...}
where f is the only element of V1(p). Thus V2(p) has at least three elements, but V2 in the
classical hierarchy has just 2.
On the other hand if a point p is related just with itself or is a maximal point, the
classical universe V and V (p) are isomorphic.
Lemma 2.2. Let, (P,≤) a partial order. Let p ∈ P such that (p, q) ∈≤⇔ q = p then V (p)
is isomorphic to V .
Proof. Let ψ : V (p)→ V given by
ψ(V0) = ∅
ψ(g) = {ψ(h) : h ∈ g(p)}.
From the definition follows that p f ∈ g iff f ∈ g(p) iff ψ(f) ∈ ψ(g) then ψ is a morphism.
We have to see now that ψ is also a bijection. Let ranp(f) = min{α ∈ On : f ∈ Vα+1(p)}
the rank of f at p.. If p x ∈ f then x ∈ f(p), and if α = rankp(f) we have f ∈ Vα+1(p),
therefore x ∈ f(p) ⊂ Vα(p) thus
rankp(x) < rankpf = α. (1)
Using this last result we want to show that ψ is injective by induction on the rank. Our
induction hypothesis will be the following one: Given α, for x, y ∈ V (p) if x 6= y and
rankp(x) < α, rankp(y) < α, then ψ(x) 6= ψ(y). If α = 0 there is nothing to prove.
Lets suppose then that the result holds for α > 0. Let f, g ∈ V (p) if ψ(f) = ψ(g) then
{ψ(h) : h ∈ f(p)} = {ψ(m) : m ∈ g}, we have then that given h ∈ f(p) there exists
m ∈ G(p) such that ψ(h) = ψ(m), but by 1 we have that the rank of m and h is less than
α thus by the inductive hypothesis h = m and we can conclude that f = g.
On the other hand given an arbitrary set B, let
B̂ : [p) = {p} →
⋃
q≥p
V (q) = V (p)
6Remember that the classical cumulative hierarchy is constructed in the next way V0 = ∅, Vα+1 = P (Vα)
and Vλ =
⋃
µ≤λ
Vµ if λ is a limit ordinal.
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B̂(p) = {â : a ∈ B}
Thus ∅̂(p) = ∅. By induction on the rank we want to show that ψ(B̂) = B. If rankp(B) = 0
then B = ∅ = ∅̂(p). Let B such that rankp(B) = α > 0, we have
ψ(B̂) = {ψ(h) : h ∈ B̂(p)}
= {ψ(h) : h ∈ {b̂ : b ∈ B}}
= {ψ(̂b) : b ∈ B}
= {b : b ∈ B} = B(by the inductive hypothesis)
Note that the rank does not grow with the order, if p < q then rankp(f) ≥ rankq(f ↾[q)
because if f ∈ Vα(p) then f ↾[q)∈ Vα(q) by the second condition in the definition of the
hierarchy. We have also that Vα ↾[p)∈ Vα+1(p) and:
Lemma 2.3. Given p ∈ P we have
V0(p) ⊂ V1(p) ⊂ V2(p) ⊂ ... ⊂ Vβ(p) ⊂ Vβ+1(p) ⊂ ...
Proof. By induction on α we will see that Vα(p) ⊂ Vα+1(p):
1. If α = 0 is evident.
2. If α is a limit ordinal and f ∈ Vα(p) =
⋃
β<α Vβ(p); then range(f) ⊂
⋃
q≥p P(Vβ(q)) for
some β < α. Since Vβ(q) ⊂
⋃
γ<α Vγ(q) = Vα(q). and range(f) ⊂
⋃
q≥p P(Vα(q)), we have
f(q) ⊂ Vα(q). The second condition of the definition follows from the fact that f ∈ Vξ(p)
for some ξ < α and by the inductive hypothesis, f ∈ Vξ+1(p). Thus f ∈ Vα+1(p).
3. If α = γ + 1 y f ∈ Vα(p), then range(f) ⊂
⋃
q≥p P(Vγ(q)). By the inductive hypoth-
esis Vγ(q) ⊂ Vγ+1(q) = Vα(q), for all q ≥ p, thus
⋃
q≥p P(Vγ(q)) ⊂
⋃
q≥p P(Vα(q)), then,
imagen(f) ⊂
⋃
q≥p P(Vα(q)). Again we can conclude f ∈ Vα+1(p).
Even if generally V (p) and V are not isomorphic there is an standard way to embed V
in V (p). Given an arbitrary set a let
â(p) : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
â(p)(q) = {b̂(p) ↾[q): b ∈ a}
Lemma 2.4. Given an arbitrary set a, p, q ∈ P such that q ≥ p we have
â(p) ↾[q)= â(q)
Proof. We prove the result by induction on the rank of a in the classical cumulative hierarchy:
i. Si rank(a) = 0, a = ∅, then
∅̂(p)(r) = ∅
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for all r ≥ q ≥ p, and
∅̂(q)(r) = ∅ = ∅̂(p) ↾[q) (r)
ii. Given α > 0 suppose the result holds for any set with rank less than α. Let a be a set
with rank(a) = α. Thus, given r ≥ q ≥ p
â(p) ↾[q) (r) = {b̂(p) ↾[r): b ∈ a}
= {b̂(r) : b ∈ a} (by the inductive hypothesis)
= {b̂(q) ↾[r): b ∈ a} (by the inductive hypothesis)
= â(q)(r)
Corollary 2.1.
â(p)(q) = {b̂(q) : b ∈ a}
It should be clear now how we should define the embedding of V in V (p).
Theorem 2.1.
Ψ : V → V(p)
Ψ(a) = â(p)
is a monomorphism.
Proof. Step 1: a 6= b iff â(p) 6= b̂(p) (Ψ is injective).
We proceed by induction on the rank of a and b. If rank(a) = 0 = rank(b), a = ∅ = b then
the result follows because the premise is false in both directions. Now consider c and d two
sets with rank α > 0. If
ĉ(p)(q) = {x̂(q) : x ∈ c} = {ŷ(q) : y ∈ d} = d̂(p)(q)
for all q ≥ p, then for x ∈ c, there exists y ∈ d such that x̂(q) = ŷ(q), since x and y are
elements of c and d respectively, their rank is less than α; thus by the inductive hypothesis
we can conclude that x = y and then c = d.
Step 2: b ∈ a iff b̂(p) ∈ â(p)(p) (Ψ is a morphism).
If a ∈ b by the corollary 2.1 â(p) ∈ b̂(p)(p). On the other hand if â(p) ∈ b̂(p)(p) = {ĉ(p) :
c ∈ b} then â(p) = ĉ(p) for some c ∈ b, but by step 1 this implies a = c, thus a ∈ b.
Step 3: â(p) ∈ V (p).
Again, we proceed by induction on the classical hierarchy:
If the rank of a is zero, a = ∅ and
∅̂(p) : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
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∅̂(p)(q) = ∅.
Therefore ∅̂(p) ∈ V1(p).
Let α > 0 and suppose that for every b with rank less than α, b̂(p) ∈ V (p). Let a be a set
such that rank(a) = α.
â(p) : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
â(p)(q) = {b̂(p) ↾[q): b ∈ a}
We see that â(p)(q) ⊂ V (q) because given b ∈ a as ran(b) < ran(a), by the inductive
hypothesis b̂(p) ∈ V (p) and then b̂(p) ↾[q)∈ V (q). On the other hand given r ≥ q ≥ p and
g ∈ â(p)(q), we have that g = b̂(q), for some b ∈ a; therefore b̂(q) ↾[r)= b̂(r) ∈ â(p)(r).
From this â(p) satisfy the conditions in the definition of the cumulative hierarchy and we
can conclude that â(p) ∈ V (p).
2.2 ZFC in V (p)
Now, we want to show that the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel plus the Axiom of choice are
forced on V (p) for each p ∈ P. Most of the axioms will be forced in its classical standard
definition, nevertheless the Axiom of Choice and the Axiom of Foundation will be forced in
some intuitionistic weaker versions that are classical equivalent to the standard ones. We
will see also how some fundamental constructions of set theory work on V (p).
Axiom of Existence: There exists a set without elements.
Lemma 2.5.
p ∃x∀y(y /∈ x)
for every p ∈ P
Proof. For every q ≥ p and f ∈ V (q) if r ≥ q, 1 f ∈ ∅̂(r) because ∅̂(r)(r) = ∅
Axiom of Extensionality: Two sets are equal if they have the same elements.
Lemma 2.6.
p ∀x∀y(∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y)
Proof. let q ≥ p and f, g ∈ V (q), suppose that z ∈ f(r) (r z ∈ f) if and only if z ∈ g(r)
(r z ∈ g) where r ≥ q ≥ p. Thus, by extensionality on the external model, f(r) = g(r).
Therefore for every r ≥ q ≥ p we have r f = g.
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Axiom of Comprehension: Let ϕ(x, z, w1, ..., wn) be a formula. For every set z
there exists a set y such that, x ∈ y if and only if x ∈ z and ϕ(x) holds for x
Lemma 2.7.
p ∀z∀w1, ..., wn∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z ∧ ϕ)
Proof. Let z, w1, ..., wn ∈ V (p) and
y : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
y(q) = {x ∈ z(q);q ϕ(x).}
Let α = ranp(z) then z ∈ Vα+1(p). Since y(q) ⊂ z(q) then y(q) ⊂ Vα(q), therefore
y : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
P (Vα(q)).
Given r ≥ q ≥ p and g ∈ y(q) we have g ∈ z(q) and q ϕ(g). Thus g ↾[r)∈ z(r) and
r ϕ(g ↾[r)). Then g ↾[r)∈ y(r) and y ∈ V (p).
Axiom of Pairing: Given two sets x and y, there exists a set z such that w ∈ z
if and only if w = x or w = y.
Lemma 2.8.
p ∀x∀y∃z(∀w(w ∈ z ↔ w = x ∨w = y)
Proof. Given q ≥ p and x, y ∈ V (q), let
z : [q)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
z(r) = {x ↾[r), y ↾[r)}.
it is clear that  w ∈ z if and only if w = x ↾[r) or w = y ↾[r). Therefore r ∀w(w ∈ z →
(w = x∨w = y)) the other direction is clear. To conclude is enough to show that z ∈ V (p).
We have z(q) ⊂ V (q) and given r ≥ q ≥ p if w ∈ z(q) then w = x ↾[q) or w = y ↾[q). Take
for example that w = x ↾[q) then w ↾[r)= (x ↾[q)) ↾[r)= x ↾[r)∈ z(r). Thus z ∈ V (p).
Axiom of Union: For any set F, there exists a set A such that x ∈ A if and only
if x ∈ Y for some Y ∈ F.
Lemma 2.9. p ∀F∃A∀Y ∀x(x ∈ Y ∧ Y ∈ F → x ∈ A)
Proof. Given q ≥ p and F ∈ V (q) let
A : [q)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
15
A(q) =
⋃
{Y (q) : Y ∈ F(q)}.
Thus given r ≥ q and Y, x ∈ V (r) if r x ∈ Y and r Y ∈ F then x ∈ Y (r) and Y ∈ F(r).
Therefore x ∈
⋃
{W (r) :W ∈ F(r)} = A(r),then r x ∈ A.
Again we have to show that A ∈ V (p). Let α = ranp(F) then F ∈ Vα+1(p). From the
latter given q ≥ p we have F(q) ⊂ Vα(q), thus A(q) =
⋃
{Y (q) : Y ∈ F(q)} ⊂ Vα(q). Let
r ≥ q ≥ p and h A(q), then there exists Y ∈ F(q) such that h ∈ Y (q). Since F ∈ V (p),
Y ↾[r)∈ F(r). Using that Y ∈ V (q) we have h ↾[r)∈ Y (r) then h ↾[r)∈ A(r).
Axiom of Power Set: For every set x there exists a set y such that z ∈ y if and
only if z ⊂ x.
Lemma 2.10.
p ∀x∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z ⊂ x)
Proof. Given f ∈ V (p) the power set g of f is defined as:
g : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
g(q) ={h : [q)→
⋃
r≥q
P (f(r)) : 1. If r ≥ q, h(r) ⊂ f(r),
2. If t ≥ r ≥ q for all i ∈ h(r), i ↾[t)∈ h(t)}.
Note that x ∈ g(q) if and only if given t ≥ r ≥ q, y ∈ V (r), y ∈ x(t) implies y ∈ f(t).
Therefore if we show that g ∈ V (p) we will have p x ∈ g ↔ ∀y(y ∈ x → y ∈ f). To
show that g ∈ V (p), let α = ranp(f). If q ≥ p since f ∈ Vα+1(p) we have f(r) ⊂ Vα+1(r),
thus P (f(r)) ⊂ P (Vα+1(r)) for r ≥ q ≥ p. On the other hand if h ∈ g(q) it is clear that
h ↾[r)∈ g(r).
Note that as in the classical hierarchy we have
p P (Vα) = Vα+1.
The Axiom of Infinity: There exists an Inductive set.
We begin defining the successor function. Let f ∈ V (p) we define Suc(f) as:
Suc(f) : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
Suc(f)(q) = {f ↾[q)} ∪ f(q).
Since f ∈ V (p) we have f ↾[q)∈ V (q) and f(q) ⊂ V (q) thus Suc(f)(q) ⊂ V (q). On the
other hand if h ∈ Suc(f)(q) then h = f ↾[q) or h ∈ f(q); in the first case h ↾[r)= (f ↾[q)
) ↾[r)= f ↾[r)∈ Suc(f)(r), in the second case h ↾[r)∈ f(r) ⊂ Suc(f)(r). Thus Suc(f) ∈ V (p).
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Furthermore it is clear that p x ∈ Suc(f)↔ x = f ∨ x ∈ f .
Recall that the set that ∅̂(p) is forced as the empty set in p. We have then that f ∈ V (p) is
an inductive set if:
p ∅̂(p) ∈ f ∨ (∀x(x ∈ f → Suc(x) ∈ f))
Lemma 2.11. ω̂(p) is an inductive set i.e.
p (∅̂(p) ∈ ω̂(p)) ∧ (∀x(x ∈ ω̂(p)→ Suc(x) ∈ ω̂(p)))
Proof. 1. Since 0 ∈ ω we have 0̂(p) = ∅̂(p) ∈ ω̂(p)(p) then p ∅̂(p) ∈ ω̂(p).
2. Let t ≥ q ≥ p and x ∈ V (q). Suppose t x ∈ ω̂(t) then x ∈ ω̂(t)(t) = {n̂(t) : n ∈ ω}, thus
x = n̂(t) for some n ∈ ω. From this we have:
Suc(n̂(t))(r) = {n̂(r)} ∪ n̂(t)(r)
= {n̂(r)} ∪ {m̂(r) : m < n}
= {â(r) : a < n+ 1}
= n̂+ 1(t)(r).
Since t n̂+ 1(t) ∈ ω̂(t) we can conclude t Suc(x) ∈ ω̂(t).
Corollary 2.2.
p ∃x(∅̂(p) ∈ x ∧ (∀y(y ∈ x→ Suc(y) ∈ x))
Axiom Schema of Replacement: Let ϕ a formula with free variables x, yA,w1, ..., wn
such that for every x there exists a unique set y such that ϕ(x, y) holds. For ev-
ery set A there exists a set Y such that for every x ∈ A there exists y ∈ Y such
that ϕ(x, y) holds.
Lemma 2.12.
p ∀A∀w1...∀wn(∀x ∈ A∃!yϕ(x, y, ...)→ ∃Y ∀x ∈ A∃y ∈ Y ϕ(x, y, ...))
Proof. Define
Y : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
Y (q) = {y : there exists x ∈ A(q) such that q ϕ(x, y, ...).
It is easy to verify that Y is the set we are looking for, again we just have to show that
Y ∈ V (p). Let y ∈ Y (q) then there exists x ∈ A(q) such that q ϕ(x, y, ...) this implies that
y ∈ V (q) then Y (q) ⊂ V (q). On the other hand given r ≥ q ≥ p, if g ∈ Y (q) let x ∈ A(q)
such that q ϕ(x, g, ...) then r ϕ(x ↾[r), g ↾[r), ...). Since x ↾[r)∈ A(r) (because A ∈ V (q))
we have g ↾[r)∈ {y : there exists x ∈ A(r) such that r ϕ(x, y, ...)} = Y (r).
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Functions on V (p).
Before proving that the axioms of foundation and choice are forced we will need to see how
the functions are defined on V (p) or in other words what kind of objects are forced as func-
tions between objects in V (p).
Given f, g ∈ V (p) lets define (f, g) as:
(f, g) : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (p)
(f, q)(q) : {{f} ↾[q), {f, g} ↾[q)}.
We have then:
Lemma 2.13.
p ∀x(x ∈ (f, g)↔ (x = {f} ∨ x = {f, g}))
Proof. Let q ≥ p then q x ∈ (f, g) implies x ∈ (f, g)(q) = {{f} ↾[q), {f, g} ↾[q)}. Thus
q x ∈ (f, g) if and only if x = {f} ↾[q) or x = {f, g} ↾[q) and this is true if and only if
q x = {f} ∨ x = {f, g}
From this follows the next important result:
Lemma 2.14. Given two arbitrary sets a, b we have
p (̂a, b)(p) = (â(p), b̂(p))
Proof.
(̂a, b)(p) : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
(̂a, b)(p)(q) = {{̂a}(q), {̂a, b}(q)}
On the other hand
(â(p), b̂(p))(q) = {{â(p)} ↾[q), {â(p), b̂(p)} ↾[q)}.
Thus, it is enough to show : 1.{̂a}(q) = {â(p)} ↾[q) and 2.{̂a, b}(q) = {â(p), b̂(p)} ↾[q).
1.{̂a}(q)(r) = {â(r)} = {â(p) ↾[r)} = {â(p)} ↾[q) (r).
2.{̂a.b}(q)(r) = {â(r), b̂(r)} = {â(p) ↾[r), b̂(p) ↾[r)} = {â(p), b̂(p)} ↾[q) (r).
The next step is to define f × g:
f × g : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
(f × g)(q) = {(a, b) ↾[q): a ∈ f(q) ∨ b ∈ g(q)}.
It is clear that
18
Lemma 2.15.
p ∀x(x ∈ F → ∃a∃b(a ∈ f ∧ b ∈ g ∧ x = (a, b))).
We have also the next results:
Lemma 2.16. Let A and B be two arbitrary sets then:
p Â(p)× B̂(p) = ̂(A×B)(p)
Proof.
(Â(p)× B̂(p))(q) = {(a, b) ↾[q): a ∈ Â(p)(q) ∧ B̂(p)(q)}
= {(m̂(q), n̂(q)) ↾[q): m ∈ A ∧ n ∈ B}
= {(̂m,n)(q) : m ∈ A ∧ n ∈ B} = Â×B(p)(q)
Corollary 2.3.
p ω̂(p)× P̂ (ω)(p) = ̂(ω × P (ω))(p)
p P̂(ω)(p)× ̂P(P(ω))(p) = ̂(P(ω)× P(P(ω)))(p)
Given A,B ∈ V (p) an object f which is to be forced as a function from A to B has to
satisfy:
p ∀x(x ∈ f → x ∈ A×B)
p “f is a function".
Therefore f has to satisfy:
p ∀x(x ∈ f → x ∈ A×B)
and
p ∀x∀a∀b(x ∈ A→ ((∃y(y ∈ B∧(x, y) ∈ f))∧((a ∈ B∧b ∈ B∧(x, a) ∈ f∧(x, b) ∈ f)→ a = b))).
The first part means that given x ∈ V (p) and q ≥ p if x ∈ f(q) then x ∈ (A × B)(q)
therefore q x = (a, b) for some a ∈ A(q) and b ∈ B(q). The second part means that
given z, a, b ∈ V (p) and q ≥ p, if z ∈ A(q) there exists y ∈ V (q) such that y ∈ B(q) and
q (z, y) ∈ f ; and that if a ∈ B(q), b ∈ B(q), q (z, a) ∈ f and q (z, b) ∈ f then a = b.
We have then:
Theorem 2.2. Let A,B ∈ V (p), then f ∈ V (p) is forced at pas a function from A to B if
and only if for every q ≥ p:
fq : A(q)→ B(q)
fq(a) = b where b satisfies q (a, b) ∈ f
is a function.
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The Axiom of Foundation
The axiom of foundation will not be forced in its standard version7 but in an alternative
version which is intuitionistically weaker (weak within intuitionistic logic) than the standard
one but classically equivalent. The standard version of the Axiom of Foundation (AF) is
given by:
AF := ∀x(∃y(y ∈ x)→ ∃y(y ∈ x ∧ ¬∃z(z ∈ x ∧ z ∈ y))
and we will prove:
Theorem 2.3.
p ¬∃x¬(∃y(y ∈ x)→ ∃y(y ∈ x ∧ ¬∃z(z ∈ x ∧ z ∈ y)))
Proof. We have to show that for every q ≥ p, x ∈ V (Q) there exists r ≥ q such that for any
t ≥ r, x(t) 6= ∅ implies the existence of y′ ∈ x(t) such that for every s ≥ t, x(s) ∩ y′(s) = ∅.
Suppose this is not the case, then there exists q ≥ p and f ∈ V (q) such that for any r ≥ q
there exists t ≥ r such that f(t) 6= ∅ and for all y′ ∈ f(t) there exists s ≥ t such that
f(s) ∩ y′(s) 6= ∅. Let g ∈ f(t), and consider s ≥ t such that there exists f1 ∈ f(s) ∩ g(s).
In the same way since f1 ∈ f(s) there exists u ≥ t such that f(u) ∩ f1(u) 6= ∅. Let
f2 ∈ f(u) ∩ f1(u) and continue the process. We obtain and infinite chain
f1 ∈ f(u)
f2 ∈ f1(u)
f3 ∈ f2(u2)
.
.
.
fn+1 ∈ fn(un)
.
.
.
which satisfies
ran(f1) > ran(f1(u1)) > ran(f2) > ... > ran(fn(un)) > fn+1 > ...
but this contradicts the classical axiom of foundation on the external model.
7See [Vi],[B1] for an example where the standard version is not forced.
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The Axiom of Choice
As with the axiom of foundation, the axiom of choice will not be forced in all its classical
formulations, for example its more natural version which asserts the existence of an election
function for any family of non empty sets will not be always forced (see [Ri],[B1]). Instead,
it will be forced an intuitionistic equivalent formulation to the Gödel translation of the next
version of the axiom of choice:
AC:=For any family F of disjoint non empty sets, there exists a set E such that
E ∩X = {z} for all x ∈ F .
In formal language we have,
AC := ∀F(∀x∀yϕ→ ψ),
where
ϕ := x ∈ F ∧ y ∈ F → ((∃z(z ∈ x ∧ z ∈ y)→ x = y) ∧ ∃z(z ∈ x))
ψ := ∃E(x ∈ F → ∃a(a ∈ E ∧ a ∈ x ∧ ∀b(b ∈ E ∧ b ∈ x→ b = a)))
We will force ¬¬AC∗, where AC∗ is the formula derived from replace each subformula of
the form ∀xφ(x) in AC by ∀x¬¬φ∗; that we know is equivalent to the Gödel translation
of AC. Before proving that ¬¬AC∗ is forced we still need a further simplification. From
intuitionistic logic we know
p ¬¬(α→ β)↔ α→ ¬¬β (2)
p ¬¬∀x¬¬ϕ↔ ∀x¬¬ϕ (3)
Then
p ¬¬AC∗ ↔¬¬∀F¬¬(∀x∀yϕ→ ψ)
∗
↔¬¬∀F¬¬(∀x¬¬(∀yϕ → ψ)∗)
↔¬¬∀F¬¬(∀x¬¬(∀y¬¬(ϕ → ψ∗) (because ϕ does not contain ∀)
↔∀F(∀x∀yϕ→ ¬¬ψ∗) (by 2, 3)
Theorem 2.4. Given p ∈ P,
p ¬¬AC
∗
Proof. Let F , X, Y ∈ V (p) and for q ≥ p suppose that q ϕ, we want to show that q ¬¬ψ∗.
By 2 we have
q ψ
∗ ↔ ∃E(X ∈ F → ∃a(a ∈ E ∧ a ∈ X ∧ ∀b(b ∈ E ∧ b ∈ X → ¬¬(b = a))). (4)
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Consider a well order on
⋃
q≥pF(q), then we can write⋃
q≥p
F(q) = {xα : α < γ}.
We will choose elements of {Xα(q)}α∈γ in the next way. Given α if we already choose one
element of Xα(q) we do not do anything and we pass to Xα+1, otherwise take xα in Xα(q)
and take xβ = xα ↾[r) in Xβ = Xα ↾[r). Define
E : [q)→
⋃
r≥q
V (q)
E(q) = {xα : Xα ∈ F(q)}
We have E(q) ⊂ V (q) because Xα(q) ⊂ V (q) for any α, on the other hand given r ≥ q, if
xα ∈ E(q) we have xα ↾[r) is the choose element of Xα(r) by construction then xα ↾[r)∈
E(r); thus we can conclude that E ∈ V (q). Note also that by construction we have that
Xα(q) ∩ E(q) contain just one element. To show that q ¬¬ψ∗ we need to find t ≥ r ≥ q
such that t ψ
∗. Given X ∈ F(q) then X ↾∈ F(r), therefore, X ↾[r)= Xα for some α ∈ γ.
Thus, there exists t ≥ r and Xβ ∈ F(t) such that Xβ = Xα ↾[t). In the step β we choose an
element xβ ∈ Xβ(t), xβ ∈ E(t) and xβ ∈ X(t) = Xα(t) = Xβ(t) and is the unique element
which satisfies both conditions, thus we have shown that
t ∃E(X ∈ F → ∃a(a ∈ E ∧ a ∈ X ∧ ∀b(b ∈ E ∧ b ∈ X → ¬¬(b = a))),
by 4 we have the result.
From the above lemmas follow then
Theorem 2.5. Given P a partial order with the topology of the hereditary subsets we have
V P ZFC,
or in ther words, for every p ∈ P, p ZFC.
And from the fundamental theorem of model theory 1.2 we have:
Theorem 2.6. Given P a partial order with the topology of the hereditary subsets and F a
generic filter over P,
V[F ] |= ZFC.
3 The independence of the Continuum Hypothesis
We can finally give an alternative and more simple proof of the independence of the Con-
tinuum Hypothesis. The Continuum Hypothesis in its original version, i.e. as postulated by
Cantor, asserts that every subset of the real numbers is enumerable or it has the cardinality
of the Continuum, 2ℵ0 . From the Dedekind construction of the real numbers we know that
the cardinality of the real numbers is the same as the cardinality of the set of subsets of N.
22
By the Cantorian diagonal argument we now |N| < |P (N)|, thus another formulation of the
Continuum hypothesis would be to say that it does not exists a set which cardinality lies
between |N| and |P (N)|. We will find an order P and a variable set B such that for every
p ∈ P,
p |N | ≤ |B| ≤ |P (N)|.
Thus for any generic filter over P the inequality will be still valid in the classical collapsed
model. We start introducing an important object which corresponds in this context to the
so called subobject classifier.
3.1 The Subobject Classifier
We know there is a correspondence between the elements of P (N) and the elements of 2N,
given by the assignation to each set S ⊆ N of its characteristic function
χ
S
: N→ 2
χ
S
(n) =
{
0 if n /∈ S
1 if n ∈ S
.
In this definition the values 0, 1 are representing the truth values in classical logic of the
proposition n ∈ S. The subobject classifier will be an object that play an analogous role to
2 in the definition of the characteristic function, but over our variable sets. To construct
this object remember that the truth values in the sheaves of structures are given by the
open sets of the base space (see the end of section 1.1). Taking P a partial order with the
topology of hereditary subsets, the truth values are precisely the hereditary subsets. If we
denote by P+ the set of hereditary subsets, the object that will define the variable set of
these truth values is given by:
Ω : P→ P+
Ω(p) = [p)+,
Where [p)+ is the set which elements are the hereditary subsets of [p). To see that Ω
play an analogous role as 2 in the definition of the characteristic function we will show the
next result
p |Ω̂(p)(p)
N| = |P (N)|, for all p ∈ P,
where in the above proposition N and P (N) are denoting the sets forced as the natural
numbers (the minimum inductive set) and its generalized power set. We start showing
which is the set forced as the natural numbers.
Lemma 3.1 (N̂(p) is the minimum inductive set).
p ∀S(∅̂(p) ∈ S ∧ (∀x(x ∈ S → Suc(x) ∈ S)))→ N̂(p) ⊆ S
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Proof. We want to show that given q ≥ p and f ∈ V (q) we have:
q (∅̂(p) ∈ f ∧ (∀x(x ∈ f → Suc(x) ∈ f)))→ N̂(p) ⊆ f,
that means to show that given t ≥ q if t (∅̂(t) ∈ f ∧ (∀x(x ∈ f → Suc(x) ∈ f))) then
t N̂(t) ⊆ f . Suppose t (∅̂(t) ∈ f ∧ (∀x(x ∈ f → Suc(x) ∈ f))), then given r ≥ t, we have
that f satisfies ∅̂(r) ∈ f(r) and for every x ∈ V (r) if x ∈ f(r) then Suc(x) ∈ f(r).
Now, we want to show that N̂(r)(r) ⊆ f(r), suppose this is not the case. Let n minimum
such that n̂(r) /∈ f(r), since ∅̂(r) ∈ f(r) then n 6= 0. Let m such that m + 1 = n, then
m̂(r) ∈ f(r) therefore Suc(m̂(s)) ∈ f(s) but Suc(m̂(s)) = m̂+ 1(s) = n̂(s) a contradiction.
Let x ∈ N̂(r)(r) then x ∈ f(r), since r ≥ t was arbitrary we have
t ∀x(x ∈ N̂(t)→ x ∈ f).
Corollary 3.1. p N = N̂(p) for all p ∈ P.
On the other hand using the power set axiom, the variable set forced as P (N) is given
by
G : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
G(q) = {h : [q)→
⋃
r≥q
P(N̂(p)(r)) : (r ≥ q ⇒ h(r) ⊆ N̂(p)(r))∧(t ≥ r ≥ q ⇒ ∀i ∈ h(r), i ↾[t)∈ h(t))}.
Now we can construct a function that is forced as a bijection between G and Ω̂(p)(p)N̂(p).
Given H such that p H ∈ G define
χ(H) = χ
H
: [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
χ
H
(q) = {(n̂(q), K̂(q)) : n ∈ N ∧K = {r ≥ p :r n̂(r) ∈ H}},
and
χ : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
χ(q) = {(H,χ
H
↾[q)) : H ∈ G(p)},
where the objects denoted as ordered pairs are the objects forced as the respective ordered
pairs.
Lemma 3.2. Let p ∈ P and H be such that p H ∈ G, then
p “χH is a function from N̂(p) to Ω̂(p)(p)”
24
Proof. To begin we have to show that χH ∈ V (p), it is clear by definition that χH(q) ⊆
V (q). On the other hand if g ∈ χH(Q) then q g = (n̂(q), K̂(q)) for some n ∈ N and
K = {r ≥ p :r n̂(r) ∈ H}, then for t ≥ q
g ↾[t)= (n̂(q), K̂(q)) ↾[t)= (̂n,K)(q) ↾[t)= (̂n,K)(t) = (n̂(t), K̂(t))
and
(n̂(t), K̂(t)) ∈ χ
H
(t) = {(n̂(t), K̂(t)) : n ∈ ω ∧K = {r ≥ p :r n̂(r) ∈ H}}.
Now we have to show that χH is forced as a function from N̂(p) to Ω̂(p)(p). If p (n̂(p), K̂(p)) ∈
χH then given r ∈ K we have that n̂(r) ∈ H(r), if s ≥ r then, by the definition of G,
r̂ ↾[s)= n̂(s) ∈ H(s) therefore s ∈ K, K ∈ [p)
+, and p K̂(p) ∈ Ω̂(p)(p). From the defini-
tion we have that f : N̂(q) → Ω̂(q)(q) such that f(n̂(q)) = K̂(q) with K as defined above
is a function for all q ≥ p then by theorem 2.2, χh is forced as a function from N̂(p) to
Ω̂(p)(p).
Theorem 3.1.
p “χ is a bijective function from G to Ω̂(p)(p)
N̂(P )”
Proof. 1. p “χ is a function from G to Ω̂(p)(p)
N̂(p) : Given q ≥ p by the above lemma
we have q χ ⊂ G× Ω̂(p)(p). On the other hand for H such that q h ∈ G, χH ↾[q) is
unique such that q (H,χh ↾[q)) ∈ χ then by 2.2 we have the result.
2. p ∀x∀y(x ∈ G∧y ∈ G∧x¬y) → (χx 6= χy): Let t ≥ q ≥ p and suppose for x, y ∈ V (t)
that t x ∈ G ∧ y ∈ G ∧ x¬y then x, y ∈ G(t) and for all r ≥ t , 1r x = y or in other
words for r ≥ t there exist s ≥ r and n ∈ N such that s n̂(s) ∈ x and 0s n̂(s) ∈ y.
We want to show that for r ≥ t, 1r χx = χy. Let s, n as above then
r ŝ(r) ∈ χx(n̂(r)) = {q̂(r) : q ≥ p∧ q n̂(q) ∈ x}
and
r ŝ(r) /∈ χy(n̂(r)).
Then 1 χx(n̂(r)) = χy(n̂(r)) and 1r χx = χy.
3. p ∀x(x ∈ Ω̂(p)(p)N̂(p) → ∃y(y ∈ G ∧ χy = x): Let X such that p X ∈ Ω̂(p)(p)N̂(p)
and consider
SX : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
P(N̂(p)(q))
SX(q) = {n̂(q) :q q̂(q) ∈ X(n̂(q))}.
Then p SX ∈ G and
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χ
SX
(q) = {(n̂(q), K̂(q)) : n ∈ N ∧K = {r ≥ p : n̂(r) ∈ SX(r)}}
= {(n̂(q), K̂(q)) : n ∈ N ∧K = {r ≥ p : n̂(r) ∈ {m̂(r) :r r̂(r) ∈ X(m̂(r))}}}
= {(n̂(q), K̂(q)) : n ∈ N ∧K = {r ≥ p :r r̂(r) ∈ X(n̂(r))}}
= {(n̂(q), X(n̂(q))) : n ∈ N} = X(q).
We conclude that p χSX = X .
3.2 The independence of CH
We start showing that for all p ∈ P
p |N̂(p)| < |P̂ (N)(p)| < | ̂P (P (N))(p)|.
Theorem 3.2.
p ¬∃f(f ⊆ ( ̂N× P (N))(p) ∧ f is a function ∧ f is onto)
Proof. We want to show that for every q ≥ p,
1q ∃f(f ⊆ ( ̂N× P (N))(p) ∧ f is a function ∧ f is onto).
Suppose there exists t ≥ p where the proposition is forced and f ∈ V (t) such that
t (f ⊆ ( ̂N× P (N))(p) ∧ f is a function ∧ f is onto).
Consider
f1 = {(a, b) : (̂a, b)(t) ∈ f(t)},
it is easy to show that f1 defines a surjective function from N to P (N) generating a contra-
diction.
In the same way we obtain,
Corollary 3.2. p ¬∃f(f ⊆ P̂(N)(p)× ̂P(P(N))(p) ∧ f is a function ∧f is onto).
And
Corollary 3.3.
p |N̂(p)| < |P̂(N)(p)| < | ̂P(P(N))(p)|.
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Until now the results presented are being proved for any partial order P with the topology
of its hereditary subsets. From this point we will work over the next order,
〈P,≤〉 = 〈fin(P (P (N))× N→ 2),⊆〉,
where
fin(P (P (N))×N→ 2) = {f : |f | < |N|∧f is a function ∧dom(f) ⊂ P (P (N))×N∧ran(f) ⊂ 2}.
Given p ∈ P define
A : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
A(q) = {(Ĥ(q), n̂(q)) : q(H,n) = 1}.
We have that p A ⊆ ̂P (P (N))(p)× N̂(p) and using A we can define
χ
A
: [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
χ
A
(q) = {((Ĥ(q), n̂(q)), K̂(q)) : H ∈ P(P(N)), n ∈ N,K = {r ≥ q :r (Ĥ(r), n̂(r)) ∈ A},
that satisfies p χA is a function from ̂P (P (N))(p) × N̂(p) to Ω̂(p)(p). Using χA we can to
construct an injective function Φ from ̂P (P (N))(p) to Ω̂(p)(p)N̂(p), in the next way.
Φ(Ĥ(p)) : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
Φ(Ĥ(p))(q) = {(n̂(q), χ
A
(Ĥ(q), n̂(q))) : n ∈ N}
Φ : [p)→
⋃
q≥p
V (q)
Φ(q) = {(Ĥ(q),Φ(Ĥ(q))) : H ∈ P(P(ω))}
Theorem 3.3. For all p ∈ P
p Φ is an injective function from ̂P (P (N))(p) to Ω̂(p)(p)
N̂(p)
Proof. From the definition and 2.2 it is clear that Φ is a function in V (p) from ̂P (P (N))(p)
to Ω̂(p)(p)N̂(p). To show that Φ is forced as an one to one function in the universe of variable
sets we want to show
p ∀x∀y((x ∈ ̂P(P(ω))(p) ∧ y ∈ ̂P(P(ω))(p) ∧ x 6= y)→ Φ(x) 6= Φ(y)).
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Consider t ≥ q ≥ p and x, y such that t ((x ∈ ̂P(P(ω))(t) ∧ y ∈ ̂P(P(ω))(t) ∧ x 6= y)
then x = Ĥ(t) and y = M̂(t) for some H,M ∈ P (P (N)) and for all r ≥ t, 1 x = y,
then H 6= M . Since t is a finite, there exists n ∈ N such that t(H,N) and t(M,n) are
not defined. Construct s ≥ t such that s(H,n) = 1 and s(M,n) = 0. If v ≥ s note that
v ŝ(v) ∈ Φ(Ĥ(v))(n̂(v)) = χA(Ĥ(v))(n̂(v)) because r(H,n) = 1. On the other hand, since
s(M,n) = 0 we have v ŝ(v) 6 inΦ(Ĥ(s))(n̂(v)). From this we conclude that for every r ≥ t,
t Φ(Ĥ(t)) 6= Φ(M̂(t)), therefore, Φ is forced as an injective function.
From this result and corollary 3.3 we obtain,
Corollary 3.4.
p |N| < |P̂(N)(p)| < |P(N)|
Finally from this corollary and theorem 1.2 we obtain.
Theorem 3.4. Consider the partial order 〈P,≤〉 = 〈fin(P (P (N)) × N → 2),⊆〉 with the
topology of its hereditary subsets. Let F a generic filter of V P then
V P[F ] |= ZFC + ¬CH.
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